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DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
MAX RHEINSTEIN*
All the world over-one is tempted to say from Alabama to
Zanzibar'-family law is undergoing change. In those parts of the
world that have become industrialized, divorce, or, as it is now
frequently called, dissolution of marriage, has become a mass
phenomenon. 2 Divorce (or in Roman Catholic countries, judicial
separation) is being facilitated universally. The changes in the
availability of divorce 3 or separation have been accompanied by
changes in the law concerning its financial consequences.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM
The Changing Model of Marriage
In Western societies, the property consequences of divorce have
been based on what is now known as housewife or maintenance
marriage. The foundation of this approach was a clear division of
labor between the sexes. The husband was expected to go out into
the world and earn a living for himself, his wife, and their children.
The wife was to stay at home and take care of the household and
the children. She was not expected to earn a living of her own,
but was to be dependent upon the husband, who was assigned the
dominant role by law. 4 Marriage was the normal way for a female
* Professor Emeritus, University of Chicago Law School; Dr. iur.
utr., University of Munich, 1924.
1. The reader should be assured that we shall not speak about Zanzi-
bar in this essay. We shall content ourselves with looking at the industrial-
ized countries of the Western world.
2. For instance, in 1974, the United States had 970,000 divorces, or 4.6
divorces for each 1000 of population, compared with only 83,000 divorces
in 1910, or .9 divorces for each 1000 of population. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMM., U.S. FACT BOOK 1976 at 51. Sweden in 1900, with
a population of 5,136,441, had 5,546 divorces. In 1973, with a population of
8,144,428, there were 16,294 divorces. STATESMAN'S YEARBOOK, STATISTICAL
AND HISTORICAL ANNUAL OF THE STATES OF THE WORLD FOR THE YEAR 1975-
1976. France, in 1969, had 38,100 divorces, or .76 divorces for each 1000
of population. DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK OF THE UNr.D NATIONS (1972).
However, in 1901, with a population of 38,595,500, there were only 7,741 di-
vorces. STATESMAN'S YEARBOOK, STATISTICAL AND HISTORICAL ANNUAL OF
THE STATES OF THE WORLD FOR THE YEAR 1904.
3. In the following text, "divorce" will be used only in the sense of
dissolution of marriage.
4. See, e.g., French Civil Code of 1804 art. 213: "The husband owes
protection to his wife, the wife owes obedience to the husband"; Spanish
Civil Code of 1888 tit. IV: same; Italian Civil Code of 1865 art. 131: "The
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to find the support necessary for life. Of course, not all women
could or wanted to find a husband-provider. If she could not sup-
port herself, a spinster had to be supported by her extended family,
by the taxpayers, or by such institutions as nunneries or brothels.
With the onset of the industrial revolution, pure housewife
marriage was an inaccurate description of the family life of increas-
ing masses of industrial workers. 5 The husband's wages rarely
satisfied the needs of the entire family. His wages had to be sup-
plemented by money earned by the wife, who was thus forced to
seek employment outside the home, largely with no decrease in her
workload as housewife. In industrialized nations like England,
Germany, Sweden, and the United States, the number of such
double-earner marriages was already considerable at the beginning
of the 20th century.6 However, 19th century law had been pat-
terned upon the model of bourgeois marriage-housewife marriage
in which the wife was economically dependent upon the husband.
As the working part of the population obtained greater politi-
cal influence, double-earner marriage began to find recognition in
the law. The Married Women's Property Acts in the United States
and the British Empire gave married women unrestricted disposi-
tion and title to their own earnings and whatever property they
might own through inheritance or other events. The Married
Women's Property Acts allowed all married women to have the
same control over property that the wealthy had commonly
obtained by means of marriage settlements. Known as marital con-
tracts (contrats de mariage, Ehevertrige, capitulaciones matri-
moniales), these settlements had also long been possible under
European-continental legal systems. The effect of the legislation
husband is the head of the family"; Civil Code of the Netherlands of 1838
art. 159, para. 1: same; Austrian Civil Code of 1811 art. 91: same; Brazilian
Civil Code of 1916 art. 233: same; Swiss Civil Code of 1907 art. 160, para.
1. See also Civil Code of Argentina Law No. 340 of 29 September 1869
arts. 184-188; Russian Code (Swod Zakonov) vol. 10, pt. 1 (1900/1909) art.
107: "The wife has to obey the husband as the head of the family"; German
Civil Code of 1896 § 1354: "The husband has the right of decision in all
matters concerning the marital life in common." As to Islamic law, see
KHADDURI & LIEBESNY, LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST (1955).
5. On the history and sociology of the family, see BURGESS & LOCKE,
THE FAMILY FROM INSTITUTION TO COMPANIONSHIP (1945); FAMILIES IN EAST
AND WEST, (Hansen & K6nig ed. 1970). For an extensive bibliography see
Kdnig, Sociological Introduction, in IV INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAw 20, 74-75 (1974). See generally Rheinstein, The Family
and the Law, in IV INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 2(1974) and bibliography, id. at 17-19; GOODE, WORLD REVOLUTION AND FAMILY
PATTERNS (4th ed. 1968).
6. The percentage of women in the total nonagricultural labor force
was 23% in the United States in 1900 and 37% in France in 1906. Dirac,Quelques vues sur le travail f$minin non-agricole en divers pays, 13 PoPu-
LATIONq 72 (1958).
[Vol. 12
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was thus limited to that part of the population among which marital
contracts had been uncommon, and where a married woman's prop-
erty ownership was limited to the fruits of her labor. Married
women were given unrestricted disposition of their earnings in Ger-
many by the Civil Code of 1896,7 in Switzerland. by the Civil Code
of 1907,1 in France by the Law of 13 July 1907, and by similar laws
in other countries.
The Changing Law of Divorce
Maintenance-marriage remained the prototype for laws regulat-
ing the financial consequences of divorce for a long time. Divorce,
if allowed at all, was difficult to obtain.9 In both Roman Catholic
and Protestant countries, divorce was viewed as a punishment for
marital misconduct; first for adultery, and later for desertion and
serious impairment of bodily integrity and health. Where there
was marital infidelity or danger to life or health, the innocent party
was to be relieved, and the guilty to be punished. A wife could
thus be freed of a husband who was intolerably cruel, who had
committed adultery under particularly serious circumstances, or
who had deserted her. Furthermore, as far as possible, the innocent
wife had to be protected financially. The guilty husband, deprived
of her company and her work in the home, remained her provider.
He would be ordered to pay her alimony so that she could live
at the same standard she would have had if the husband had not
been guilty of the misconduct that made life with him intolerable.
On the other hand if the wife had broken the vow of marital
fidelity by even a single act of adultery or other conduct that made
life with her intolerable, or if she had eloped from the marital
home, the husband would be entitled to repudiate her and throw
her out in the cold without any duty to continue her support. Only
if the wife would become a public charge as a result of such non-
support might the ex-husband have to pay for her subsistence, since
he was regarded as being nearer to her than the taxpayers.
The obligation of support upon divorce was not reciprocal,
however. Since women were thought to be economically de-
pendent upon men, they were not regarded as providers for their
husbands. An ex-wife could thus make a claim for alimony against
her ex-husband, but an ex-husband could not make that claim
against his ex-wife. Men, married or unmarried, had to take care
of themselves.
7. § 1364.
8. Art. 191, no. 3.
9. On the history and recent development of divorce see M. RHEIN-
STEN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LAw (1972).
1976]
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In certain jurisdictions, divorce could bring with it the obliga-
tion of an ex-husband to give his ex-wife part of the property that
during marriage he alone had managed and enjoyed. This obliga-
tion could arise in Anglo-American common law jurisdictions
where, during marriage, the husband was the owner of all personal
property that but for the marriage would be the wife's, and where,
under his estate iure uxoris, he was entitled to all the fruits of
her real property. Upon judicial separation, or later, divorce, the
court of equity could require the husband to provide an equitable
settlement for his wife.
After a judicial separation or divorce in community property
jurisdictions, an ex-wife might obtain part of the fund that was
under the sole management and enjoyment of the husband. 10
While during marriage the husband managed and enjoyed the
community fund, title to the assests of the fund belonged to both
spouses in equal parts. Upon the termination of the marriage, the
wife was entitled to possession of her one-half interest, or if the
marriage was ended by her death, her interest vested in her heirs
or devisees. The wife's right to her share in the assets of the com-
munity fund apparently exists in all community property jurisdic-
tions even if she was guilty of conduct that caused the collapse
of the marriage.
Today, the notion of divorce as punishment for marital miscon-
duct and as a reward for the innocent party lingers on in the statutes
of a diminishing number of jurisdictions. We now look upon
divorce as an increasingly accessible escape from a marriage that
has failed to live up to expectation. Almost universally, judicial
practice has turned divorce-sanction into divorce faillite, and stat-
utes are following suit with increasing frequency. In one form or
another, with or without delay, with or without right of opposition
by an innocent party, no-fault divorce has become available in the
Nordic countries, the socialist countries, the Netherlands, West Ger-
many, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Portugal, France, Japan, Eng-
land, Australia, Canada, several Latin American countries, as well
as, it now seems, 47 of the 53 jurisdictions of the United States."
10. At the beginning of the 20th century the following jurisdictions
had community property as the legal regime of marital property: Universal
community: Brazil, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway, Por-
tugal, South Africa, Sweden. Community of movables and acquests:
Belgium, France, Haiti, Luxembourg, Quebec. Community of acquests:
Argentina, Arizona, Bolivia, California, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador,
Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, Spain,
Texas, Uruguay, Washington.
11. For divorce laws in the United States see FAMILY LAW REPORTER,
REFERENcE FILE 401-53 (1974); Freed, Grounds for Divorce in the American
Jurisdictions (as of June 1, 1974), 8 FAMILY L.Q. 401 (1974). The jurisdic-
[Vol. 12
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The increased availability of divorce and the concomitant trans-
formation of marriage demand that the law dealing with the
financial consequences of divorce be altered. Not only is the view
of divorce as punishment disappearing, but the dominance of main-
tenance-marriage is also declining. The old division of labor
between the sexes is breaking down, and "housewife" marriage is
no longer the general model. Double-earner marriage is beginning
to prevail as industrialization proceeds. 12  Consequently, female
dependence on the male is no longer the rule. Alimony is no longer
tions listed in this survey as granting divorce solely on fault grounds are
Illinois, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota. Out-
side of the United States no-fault divorce has become increasingly available,
either upon the sole ground of irretrievable marriage breakdown or upon
the ground of breakdown in addition to misconduct. Numerous laws re-
quire waiting periods, occasionally of considerable length. Under a de-
creasing number of laws a no-fault divorce can be denied or delayed upon
opposition of the respondent party. The relevant laws are those of Sweden,
Divorce Reform Law of 1974; Finland, Marriage Law of 13 June 1929 as
amended by Law of 22 December 1949 pt. III, ch. 2; Denmark, Law of 4
June 1969, No. 256 concerning Conclusion and Dissolution of Marriage ch. 4;
Norway, Law on Conclusion and Dissolution of Marriage of 31 May 1918
in the version of 28 July 1949 ch. 5; Iceland, Law No. 39 on Conclusion
and Dissolution of Marriage of 27 June 1921 ch. 7; U.S.S.R., Law of the Su-
preme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on the Confirmation of the Principles of the
Legislation of the U.S.S.R. and the Union Republics, on Marriage and the
Family, of 27 June 1968 art. 14; Albania, Family Code, Law No. 4020 of
23 June 1965 ch. 5; Bulgaria, Family Code of 15 March 1969 ch. 3; People's
Republic of China, Civil Code, Book IV, Book of the Family, tit. IV, arts.
1049-51; Cuba, Family Code of 1975; Czechoslovakia, Family Law of 4
December 1963 pt. I, ch. 5; East Germany, Family Code of 20 December
1965 § 24; Hungary, Law on Marriage, Family and Guardianship IV/1952
in the version of Law VI/1957 § 18; Poland, Code on Family and Guardian-
ship of 25 February 1964 art. 56-60; Rumania, Family Code of 29 March
1953 in the version of Decree of 7/8 October 1966 art. 38; Yugoslavia, Fed-
eral Basic Law on Marriage of 3 April 1946 in the version of 28 April 1963
art. 56; Netherlands, Law of 1 October 1971 art. 151; West Germany, Civil
Code §§ 1564-68 in the version of Law adopted June 1976; Austria, Mar-
riage Law of 6 July 1938 § 55; Switzerland, Civil Code of 1907 art. 142; Italy,
Law on Dissolution of Marriage, No. 898 of 18 December 1970 art. 3, no.
2; Portugal, Divorce Law of 1975; France, Law on the Reform of Divorce,
No. 75-617 of 11 July 1975; Luxembourg, Civil Code of 1804 in the version
of Law of 6 February 1975 art. 275 et seq.; England, Divorce Reform Act
1969 art. 1, 2(1) (d), (e); Canada, Divorce Act 1967-68, ch. 24 of 1 February
1968 sec. 4(1) (e); Australia, Family Law Act 1975.
The texts of the laws of Austria, East Germany, Switzerland, and West
Germany, and German Translations of the other laws cited above (except
those of Sweden, Portugal, France, Luxembourg, Australia, and Canada)
can be found in BERGMANN & FERID, INTERNATIONALES EHE-UND KIND-
SCHAFTSRECHT. On the French law see Glendon, The French Divorce Reform
Law of 1976, 24 AM. J. COMP. L. 199 (1976); on Sweden, Sage, Dissolution
of the Family under Swedish Law, 9 FAMILY L.Q. 375 (1975).
12. See the tables in Glendon & Rheinstein, Marriage: Interspousal
Relations, in IV INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 4(forthcoming).
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a universal necessity, and the precariousness of its enforcement is
being recognized. On the other hand, people are demanding that
alimony be available to men who are economically dependent on
their wives. The frequent insufficiency of the right to alimony,
together with the postulated equality of husband and wife, is result-
ing in an increased demand for property sharing upon divorce.
Accompanying these new trends is the reluctance to give up the
ideal of marriage as a lifelong full community, "for better or worse,
in sickness and health," and the simultaneous desire to treat divorce
as a clear-cut termination of a relationship so that it does not stand
in the way of a new family. These ideals in good measure contra-
dict each other and the problem of how to reconcile them is trouble-
some. It is no wonder then that various solutions to this problem
are being attempted.
If the traditional approach to property division survives any-
where it is in Austria 1 3 and in the State of New York.1 4 Upon
divorce, the court merely unscrambles what is his and what is hers,
and the parties walk away with what they own. No asset belonging
to one party is to be assigned to the other, and there is no com-
munity fund to be divided. Nothing but a claim for alimony against
the ex-husband can be given to the ex-wife. The one new feature
is that alimony may be granted to the husband, though neither
spouse is entitled to alimony if he or she was the guilty party. In
both jurisdictions the situation is likely to change in the near
future.
In the just mentioned system, husband and wife are treated
as equals insofar as each of them owns and manages his or her
earnings and other property independently of the other. As far
as property is concerned, husband and wife are like any other two
people. They may pool resources for special purposes, or one may
entrust the other with the management of all or some of his
funds.15 If upon dissolution of the marriage one spouse is needy
while the other is in a financially better position, the latter must
come to the rescue of the former, provided the needy party has
not forfeited assistance through marital guilt. In this respect the
system is based upon the model of the housewife, or maintenance,
13. Austrian Civil Code of 1811 § 1237; Marriage Law of 6 July 1938
(German Reichsgesetzblatt 1938 I. 807) §§ 66-69; GscHNTZE, FAWLIN-
RECHT 43 (1963).
14. Foster & Freed, Marital Property Reform in New York: Partner-
ship of Co-Equals? 8 FAMILY L.Q. 169 (1974).
15. The existence of a marriage between two persons can still influ-
ence their individual property through the existence of such rights as dower,
curtesy, homestead, and rights of one spouse in the estate of the decased
spouse.
[Vol. 12
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marriage. It is the withering of this marriage model that has
rendered the system obsolete.16
Ir. SOLUTIONS BASED ON COMMUNITY PROPERTY CONCEPTS
The growth of double-earner marriage has revived interest in
the treatment of marital property matters that evolved when most
marriages were a joint enterprise of husband and wife running a
farm, store, or craft shop. Whatever assets were acquired by such
a joint effort were owned by them jointly as their community prop-
erty. In Spain and in parts of Central Europe, the community
property is limited to the marital acquests, i.e. the funds that are
acquired by the gainful activity of either spouse. What each of
them brought into the marriage or what either acquired during
marriage by inheritance or donation remains his or her separate
property and stays outside the community fund. As long as tradi-
tion prevailed, the management of the community fund and the
right to its fruits during the marriage belonged to the husband,
who in turn had to support his wife and his dependent children.
The community ceases upon the death of one of the spouses, and
the community fund is equally divided between the surviving
spouse and the heirs of the predeceased spouse. Upon judicial
separation, or as it has become available, divorce, the community
fund is also divided equally without consideration of guilt. If there
are no acquests, or if a divorced spouse's share is insufficient for
his future support, alimony is provided.
In the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, Portugal, and some
Central European systems, community property has been more
comprehensive. From the Netherlands the system of universal
community was carried to its onetime colony South Africa. From
Portugal (where it has now been replaced by community of
acquests) universal community was carried to Brazil, where it still
exists in a strangely modified form. Under the system of universal
community, the community fund consists, at least on general prin-
ciple, of all the assets of the spouses, which are distributed in equal
parts upon the termination of the marriage.
An intermediate system of community of movables and
acquests held sway in parts of Central Europe and in the heartland
of France. Under this system, the community fund consists of all
movable assets of the spouses, irrespective of the time and mode
of acquisition, and all movable or immovable property acquired
16. A comprehensive survey, analysis, and critique of legal systems of
marital property will be contained in Glendon & Rheinstein, Marriage: In-
terspousal Relations, in IV INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE
LAw ch. 4 (forthcoming).
1976]
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during marriage by gainful activity of either spouse. Each party
remained the separate owner of the immovables acquired by him
or her before marriage or during marriage by inheritance or dona-
tion. This intermediate approach found its way into the unified
legal system of France through Napoleon's Civil Code of 1804. In
France, the system was changed to one of community of acquests
by the reform law of 13 July 1965. As of 1975, the intermediate
system could be found only in Belgium and Haiti.
In practice the difference between universal community. and
community of acquests is less formidable than it seems. Under all
systems of community of acquests, assets are presumed to be com-
munity if their mode and time of acquisition cannot be proved.
Since the parties ordinarily fail to keep inventories and tend to
commingle their assets, at least the movables existing at the time
of liquidation are likely to be treated as community assets.
Community property, with its equal division of the community
fund upon the termination of a marriage, is misleadingly referred
to as the system of the civil law. It did not exist in Roman law,
but originated in Germanic customs. Community property has not
penetrated into all the regions of civil law. On the other hand,
it became the marital property system of nine American jurisdic-
tions whose legal systems are otherwise that of the common law
(Arizona, California, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washing-
ton, the Canal Zone, and Guam). Community property also exists
in Louisiana and Puerto Rico, where private law is still generally
based upon civil law.
Why should a wife working as keeper of the home and nurse
of the children be in a less favorable position than the married
woman who works outside the home, earns her own living, and
accumulates her own savings? Does not the housewife through her
work enable the husband to earn money and accumulate his sav-
ings? Is she not his partner in a joint venture and therefore
entitled to participate in his acquests? Such questions have been
posed with increasing urgency as housewife marriage gives way to
double-earner marriage. In jurisdictions with community property
systems, whether universal or of acquests, the postulate of sharing
had already been realized. But how should it be implemented in
noncommunity property jurisdictions? Should a husband pay his
housewife-spouse a salary commensurate with what she could earn
if she worked outside of the home, or with the amount the husband
might have to expend if he hired an outside person as housekeeper?
Such proposals would not only be difficult to implement, they
would also be widely regarded as incompatible with marriage.
[Vol. 12
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Where systems of community property had been in force, and
thus where no new means to accomplish sharing seemed to be
needed, another problem arose. How could community property
be combined with that other postulate of modern times, equality
of husband and wife? Traditionally, the marital community fund
had been managed by the husband, who needed the consent of his
wife only for exceptional transactions such as the alienation or
encumbrance of an immovable or a business. How could the wife
be made a general co-manager? Would it be feasible to have a
ship with two captains? Different answers have been given to this
troublesome question, and in the process community property sys-
tems have been profoundly transformed.
The French Law of 1907 was an early inroad into the concen-
tration of management in the husband. As already stated, this law
entitled the wife to the independent management of the earnings
she obtained through working outside the home. Whatever might
remain in this libre salaire at the termination of the marriage would
be added to that part of the community fund that had been sub-
ject to the management of the husband. The law was not formu-
lated so that third parties could easily ascertain whether or not
an asset was one that the married woman could dispose of on her
own. Therefore, the French law, like its Belgian counterpart of
20 July 1932, remained a dead letter until it was amended in the
1940's.
A much more radical step was taken in the legislation of the
five Nordic countries: Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway, and
Iceland. In the first two countries the traditional system of marital
property law was community of movables and acquests. The other
three used the universal community system. The husband was
theoretically the manager of all the property of both spouses.
Under the new laws, 7 each spouse is the owner and manager of
his or her assets. When the marriage is ended by death or divorce,
or if the community system is terminated through agreement of
the parties or by some other means, the funds of the two parties
are combined and then divided equally. This system of deferred
community property can be characterized as a combination of
separation of assets during marriage with community of property
upon termination. But during the first stage each party must con-
sider that the management of his assets will necessarily affect what
the other will have upon termination. Therefore, transactions
17. Sweden, Marriage Law of 11 June 1920, No. 415; Finland, Law No.
234 of 13 June 1929; Denmark, Law No. 56 of 18 March 1925; Norway, Ch.
3, para. 16, Law No. 1 of 20 May 1927; Iceland, Law of 20 June 1923. On
the Swedish law, see SUSSMAN, Spouses and Their Property Under Swedish
Law, 12 AM. J. CoMP. L. 553 (1963).
19761
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of special importance such as disposition of immovables may not
be made without the consent of the other spouse. A spouse gen-
erally may be held liable in damages if he or she has intention-
ally impaired the ultimate interest of the other.
Prior to the carefully drafted, detailed Nordic legislation, the
idea of deferred community property was expressed in rudimentary
form in three brief sections of the Civil Code of Costa Rica of 26
April 1886. In later years more elaborate schemes of deferred com-
munity of acquests were introduced in Columbia,' 8 Argentina, 19
Uruguay,20 and Israel.2 1 Deferred community was also regarded
as the proper combination of sharing and equal rights in a modi-
fied form called community of increase (Zugewinngemeinschaft)
when it was adopted in 1957 in the Equal Rights Law of West
Germany. 22  Another modified form of deferred community
developed in Texas when that state's system of community property
was modernized in the Family Code of 1970.23
In a deferred community property jurisdiction, each party is the
master of his own fund during the marriage, limited only by -the
need to have the consent of his spouse for transactions of special im-
portance. Contrasted with this approach is the system of the Soviet
Union and other East European socialist countries. The community
of acquests fund is managed jointly by husband and wife. But
either spouse is presumed to have the other's power of representa-
tion in ordinary transactions. This system of mutual representation
can work well in a society where private ownership is limited to
goods for use and consumption and where all means of production
remain in the sphere of public ownership and thus outside of the
scope of marital property. Yet similar systems of mutual represen-
18. Law No. 28 of 1932.
19. Law of 22 April 1968.
20. Law No. 783 of 18 September 1946.
21. Property Relations Law of 1973.
22. Law of 18 June 1957.
23. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.24 (1975) provides:
§ 5.24. Protection of Third Persons(a) During marriage, property is presumed to be subject to
the sole management, control, and disposition of a spouse if it is
held in his or her name, as shown by muniment, contract, deposit
of funds, or other evidence of ownership, or if it is in his or her
possession and is not subject to such evidence of ownership.
(b) A third person dealing with a spouse is entitled to rely(as against the other spouse or anyone claiming from that spouse)
on that spouse's authority to deal with the property if:
(1) the property is presumed to be subject to the sole manage-
ment, control, and disposition of the spouse; and(2) the person dealing with the spouse:
(A) is not a party to a fraud upon the other spouse of another
person; and
(B) does not have actual or constructive notice of the spouse's
lack of authority.
[Vol. 12
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tation have recently been adopted in Italy24 and in the states of
Arizona, California, Idaho, and Washington. 25 These laws set out
more comprehensively and in greater detail the transactions for
which cooperation of both spouses is required.
Jurisdictions in which community property already existed had
to adapt in order to achieve legal equality between husband and
wife. In West Germany and Italy, where community property had
not been the system, it was introduced in modified form for the
purpose of adding a scheme of sharing to a scheme of equal
rights. 26
III. SOLUTIONS UNDER SEPARATE PROPERTY SYSTEMS
Property sharing has been sought in jurisdictions of Anglo-
American law by various methods. At least in a formal sense,
equality of husband and wife in the ownership and management
of property had been accomplished by the Married Women's Prop-
24. Italian Civil Code as amended by New Family Law of 5 May 1975
art. 180.
25. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.030 (1974) reads:
Property not acquired or owned, as prescribed in [the code sec-
tions defining separate property], acquired after marriage by either
husband or wife or both, is community property. Either spouse,
acting alone, may manage and control community property, with
a like power of disposition as the acting spouse has over his or
her separate property, except:
(1) Neither spouse shall devise or bequeath by will more than
one-half of the community property.
(2) Neither spouse shall give community property without the
express or implied consent of the other.
(3) Neither spouse shall sell, convey, or encumber the commu-
nity real property without the other spouse joining in the execution
of the deed or other instrument by which the real estate is sold,
conveyed, or encumbered, and such deed or other instrument must
be acknowledged by both spouses.
(4) Neither spouse shall purchase or contract to purchase com-
munity real property without the other spouse joiring in the trans-
action of purchase or in the execution of the contract to purchase.
(5) Neither spouse shall create a security interest other than
a purchase money security interest as defined in RCW 62A.9-107
in, or sell, community household goods, furnishings, or appliances
unless the other spouse joins in executing the security agreement
or bill of sale, if any.
(6) Neither spouse shall acquire, purchase, sell, convey, or en-
cumber the assets, including real estate, or the good will of a busi-
ness where both spouses participate in its management without the
consent of the other: Provided, That where only one spouse par-
ticipates in such management the participating spouse may in the
ordinary course of such business, acquire, purchase, sell, convey
or encumber the assets, including real estate, or the good will of
the business without the consent of the nonparticipating spouse.
See also ARIz. REv. STAT. § 25-214 (Supp. 1973); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5125,
5127 (1975); IDAHo CODE § 32-911 (1974).
26. West Germany, Equal Rights Law of 18 June 1957; Italy, New
Family Law of 5 May 1975.
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erty Acts. But, as we have seen, the separate ownership of his
or her respective assets meant that on divorce both spouses would
walk away with whatever each happened to own. In the case of
a housewife, this easily meant nothing. If she needed support, she
would be given a claim for alimony against the husband. This
claim would be precarious, if enforceable at all, and it might be
forfeited if she was guilty of adultery or other serious marital mis-
conduct. In common law countries, dissatisfaction with this state
of affairs has been expressed less vociferously and less systemati-
cally than in Europe. The dissatisfaction has been felt no less
deeply, however. The courts have quietly and almost imperceptibly
brought about changes in the majority of jurisdictions. 27
In all common law states except Pennsylvania, the court can
make an award of alimony, i.e. order one party to contribute to
the support of the other by periodical payments of money. Every
now and then an obligor spouse may prefer to free himself or her-
self of the permanent obligation by paying all of it at its capital-
ized value. The obligee may likewise prefer capital in his or her
hands to the expectation of receiving a pension every month or
week. A number of courts decided they were powerless to order
transformation of a pension into a lump sum when it was not
expressly authorized by statute. Other courts assumed that they
had such power even in the absence of explicit legislation. In
any case, appropriate statutes have now been enacted almost
everywhere.
Where an award of lump sum alimony is possible, payment may
be ordered in a variety of forms: a sum of money payable all at
once; a fixed sum of money payable in a fixed number of successive
installments; transfer of property assets to the obligee or a trustee
for the benefit of the obligee; or any combination of these modes
of payment. The distinction between alimony as a means of sup-
port, and the unscrambling of the parties' property, can easily be
lost in such a process. As a result, in the great majority of non-
community property states, divorce can be combined with a redis-
tribution of the spouses' property under the guise of alimony, as
a mixture of alimony and property settlement, or in the application
of a general power of property redistribution. The power to take
such measures is assumed by the courts or, as in Oregon,28 is
expressly given to the courts by statute. Such a redistribution is
27. See R. LEVY, UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION: A PRE-
LIMINARY ANALYSIS 164 (1969); H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS §
14.8, at 449 (1968). The texts of the state laws concerning property arrange-
ments upon divorce, as of 1969, are set out in R. LEVY, supra app. B.
28. OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105(c), (d), (e).
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not limited to the fund of marital acquests, as it is in traditional
community property jurisdictions. 29 There can be a redistribution
of all property owned by the parties and, in the extreme case, allot-
ment to one party of all the property owned by the other.
The amalgamation of alimony and property settlement has been
promoted by the desire to constitute divorce so that it brings about
a final and definite termination of the relationship between the par-
ties. As the view that dissolution of a marriage should clear the
way for establishment of a new family gains ground, the tendency
to eliminate as much as possible future obligations between ex-
spouses also increases in strength, and the courts welcome the
opportunity to ease the burden of post-divorce litigation over
enforcement or modification of alimony claims.
Diverse approaches to property division thus exist among the
jurisdictions in the United States. There are still states in which
the court is limited to unscrambling the property already owned
by each of the spouses and cannot redistribute property upon
divorce.8 0 In these states alimony is granted strictly for the pur-
pose of providing support for a party who needs it and, as in New
York, has not forfeited it by marital misconduct. On the other
hand, in the common law jurisdiction of Pennsylvania and the com-
munity property state of Texas, divorce is treated as a final act
with such consistency that no periodic alimony is to be ordered and
the future is taken care of exclusively by the redistribution of the
29. TEx. FAM. CODE § 3.63 (1975) seems to give the court power to re-
assign all the property of the parties upon divorce. However, in view of
its legislative history, the provision has been interpreted as not extending
to separate real property. Ramirez v. Ramirez, 524 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. Ct.
Civ. App. 1975). On the Texas Family Code concerning property division
upon divorce, see Raggis & Rasor, The Anatomy of a Family Code, 8 FAMILY
L.Q. 105, 128, 131 (1974).
30. In 1975 this group included Illinois, Florida, New York, and Vir-
ginia. ILL. Rzv. STAT. ch. 40, § 18 (1976) provides:
Whenever a divorce is granted, if it shall appear to the court that
either party holds the title to property equitably belonging to the
other, the court may compel conveyance thereof to be made to the
party entitled to the same, upon such terms as it shall deem equita-
ble.
This provision has been consistently held to apply solely to situations where
one spouse holds an equitable interest, in the traditional sense, in property
the legal interest of which is in the other. See Overton v. Overton, 6 Ill.
App. 3d 1086, 287 N.E.2d 47 (1972); Everett v. Everett, 25 Ill. 2d 342, 185
N.E.2d 201 (1962). The application of the statute will sometimes result in
equal division upon a finding of joint enterprise, or sometimes in awarding
unequal shares. Compare Gerhardt v. Gerhardt, 18 11. App. 3d 658, 310
N.E.2d 224 (1974) with Norris v. Norris, 16 Ill. App. 3d 879, 307 N.E.2d 181
(1974). It has also been held that a redistribution of property that is im-
proper under ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, § 18 (1976) may be achieved as an
award of lump sum alimony under ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, § 19 (1976),
Palacio v. Palacio, 2 FAMILY LAW REPORTER 2031 (II. Ct. App. 1975).
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parties' property.3 1 Although it is the tendency of the majority
of the noncommunity property jurisdictions to combine redistribu-
tion of property with alimony, there are community property juris-
dicitions where partition of the fund of marital acquests can be
combined with alimony. There is also the difference between Cali-
fornia, where the community fund can be divided in no proportion
other than that of fifty-fifty,3 2 and the other community property
states, where the fixation of the redistribution shares is more or
less left to the discretion of the court.
IV. JUDICIAL DISCRETION AS A SOLUTION
The Uniform Act on Marriage and Divorce (UMDA) 3 3 is an
attempt to bring uniformity to the area of property division. This
very Act, however, illustrates the difficulty of the task. Sections
307 and 30834 of the Act, proposed and approved in 1970 by the
31. H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 14.1, at 421 n.12 (1968).
In Delaware and North Carolina the statutes have now been amended to al-
low alimony awards. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1512 (1975); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 50-16.1 to 50-16.9 (1974).
32. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (1975). Exceptions are permitted in the fol-
lowing situations:
1. when property has been deliberately misappropriated by one party
to the exclusion of the community property or quasi-community property
interest of the other party;
2. if the net value of the community property or quasi-community
property is less than $5,000 and the other party cannot be located;
3. community property constituting damages for personal injury.
33. 1970 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 180 (1970).
34. Sections 307 and 308 may be found id. at 202-05.
Section 307. [Disposition of Property]
(a) In a proceeding for dissolution of the marriage, or for legal
separation, or a proceeding for disposition of property following
dissolution of the marriage by a court which lacked personal juris-
diction over the absent spouse or lacked jurisdiction to dispose of
the property, the court shall set apart to each spouse his property
and shall divide the marital property without regard to marital
misconduct, in such proportions as the court deems just after con-
sidering all relevant factors including:
(1) contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the mar-
* tal property, including the contribution of a spouse as homemaker;
(2) value of the property set apart to each spouse; and
(3) economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the div-
ision of property is to become effective, including the desirability
of awarding the family home or the right to live therein for reason-
able periods to the spouse having custody of any children.
(b) For purposes of this Act only, "marital property" means
all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage
except:
(1) property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent;
(2) property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior
to the marriage or in exchange for property acquired by gift, be-
quest, devise, or descent;
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National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, are
characterized by the following features:
1. The sole ground for divorce is "that the marriage is irre-
trievably broken" (sec. 302).
2. The purpose of disposition of property on divorce is not
merely that of determining who owns what, but also to take care
of future needs insofar as a spouse cannot be, or cannot be made
to be, self-supporting.
(3) property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal sep-
aration;
(4) property excluded by valid agreement of the parties; and(5) the increase in value of property acquired prior to the
marriage.(c) All property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the
marriage and prior to a decree of legal separation is presumed to
be marital property regardless of whether title is held individually
or by the spouses in some form of co-ownership such as joint ten-
ancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by the entirety, and community
property. The presumption of marital property is overcome by a
showing that the property was acquired by a method listed in sub-
section (b).
COMMENT
Subsection (a) establishes standards for the court's disposition
of property in four kinds of proceedings: (1) dissolution of mar-
riage; (2) legal separation; (3) independent proceedings for prop-
erty disposition following an earlier proceeding for dissolution of
the marriage in which the court had lacked jurisdiction over the
person of the absent spouse, and (4) independent proceedings for
property disposition following an earlier proceeding for dissolution
of marriage in which the court made no disposition, equitable or
otherwise, of property located in the enacting state. In all four
kinds, the court is directed first to set apart to each spouse all of
his or her property that is not defined as marital property by sub-
section (b), and secondly to divide the marital property between
the parties in accord with the standards established by the section.
The court may divide the marital property equally or unequally
between the parties, having regard for the contributions of each
spouse in the acquisition thereof, the value of each spouse's non-
marital property, and the relative economic position of each spouse
following the division. The court is directed not to consider mari-
tal misconduct, such as adultery or other non-financial misdeeds,
committed during the marriage, in its division. If the parties have
reached a mutually satisfactory property settlement agreement
which is not unconscionable (see Section 306) the court will not
be called upon to make a disposition under this section.
Community property states which require an equal division of
community property on termination of marriage may wish to sub-
stitute that rule in this section. Appropriate changes to achieve
this aim would be to substitute for the language beginning "without
regard for marital misconduct" the words "equally between the
spouses." Subdivisions (1), (2) and (3) of subsection (a) could
then be omitted; but the state may wish to retain, as a final sen-
tence in subsection (a) the following: "In making the division,
the court may consider the desirability of awarding the family
home or the right to live therein for reasonable periods to the
spouse having custody of any children."
Subsection (b) defines marital property only for the purposes
of division on dissolution of marriage or legal separation. No at-
tempt is made to regulate the respective interests of the spouses
in property during the existence of the marriage.
Subsection (c) creates a presumption that all property ac-
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3. The property that can be redistributed is limited to what
would be the community fund in a system of community of
acquests. Each party remains entitled, however, to keep whatever
"separate property" he or she may own.
quired after marriage and prior to a decree of legal separation is
marital property. In the absence of contrary evidence this pre-
sumption will be controlling, regardless of the manner in which
title is held by the spouse. A spouse seeking to overcome the pre-
sumption has the burden of proof on the issue of identification. The
presumption is overcome by a showing that the property (1) was
acquired prior to the marriage, was the increase in value of such
property, or was acquired after the marriage, in exchange for such
property; (2) was acquired after the marriage by gift, bequest, de-
vise, or descent or in exchange for property so acquired; (3) was
acquired after the entry of a decree of legal separation; or (4) was
designated as non-marital property by a valid agreement of the
spouses, all as provided in subsection (b). The phrase "increase
in value" used in subsection (b) (5) is not intended to cover the
income from property acquired prior to the marriage. Such income
is marital property. Similarly, income from other non-marital
property acquired after the marriage is marital property.
SEcTIoN 308. [Maintenance](a) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal sep-
aration, or a proceeding for maintenance following dissolution of
the marriage by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over
the absent spouse, the court may grant a maintenance order for
either spouse only if it finds that the spouse seeking maintenance:(1) lacks sufficient property, including marital property ap-
portioned to him, to provide for his reasonable needs, and(2) is unable to support himself through appropriate employ-
ment or is the custodian of a child whose condition or circum-
stances make it appropriate that the custodian not be required to
seek employment outside the home.(b) The maintenance order shall be in such amounts and for
such periods of time as the court deems just, without regard to
marital misconduct, and after considering all relevant factors in-
cluding:(1) the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance,
including marital property apportioned to him and his ability to
meet his needs independently, including the extent to which a pro-
vision for support of a child living with the party includes a sumfor that party as custodian;(2) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or train-
ing to enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate
employment;(3) the standard of living established during the marriage;(4) the duration of the marriage;(5) the age, and the physical and emotional condition of the
spouse seeking maintenance; and(6) the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought
to meet his needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking main-
tenance.
COMMENT
Section 308 (a) authorizes the court to order maintenance to
either spouse in three kinds of proceedings: (1) dissolution of mar-
riage; (2) legal separation; and (3) independent proceedings for
maintenance following an earlier proceeding for dissolution of the
marriage by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the
absent spouse and thus could not affect maintenance [see comment
to Section 302 (a) ]. In all three kinds of proceedings the court may
award maintenance only if both findings listed in (1) and (2) are
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4. The distribution of the marital acquests is not to be made
in any fixed proportion, but is to be based on the discretion of the
court.
5. In the exercise of its discretion the court is guided by a
set of statutory directives; it is forbidden, however, to consider
marital misconduct.
The scheme of the UMDA met with what one may term violent
critique in the Special Committee of the Family Law Section of
the American Bar Association. 5  While the ABA Section agreed
with the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws that a marriage
ought to be dissolved when it had broken down irretrievably, it
insisted that courts should be guided by a statutory indication of
circumstances under which such irretrievable breakdown exists.
Both groups agreed that accusations of marital misconduct should
be excluded, not only in the decision about the dissolution of
the marriage, but also in the determination of its financial
consequences.
There has been little controversy either as to the disdain for
fixed proportions in the allotment of property to be distributed or
about the catalog of factors to guide the courts in dividing property.
Controversy has arisen, however, over the scope of the property
that may be distributed between divorced spouses. Should it be
limited to the "marital property" or should the court have power
to redistribute every thing that might be owned by them? The for-
mer position-that of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws-
was the system of community of acquests as it had been taken from
Spain by the American community property jurisdictions. The
latter position-that of the Family Law Section of the ABA-has
been developing in the noncommunity property states. It had also
long been the position of the community property state of Texas
and, as we may add, of the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, and
made. The dual intention of this Section and Section 307 is to en-
courage the court to provide for the financial needs of the spouses
by property disposition rather than by an award of maintenance.
Only if the available property in insufficient for the purpose and
if the spouse who seeks maintenance is unable to secure employ-
ment appropriate to his skills and interests or is occupied with child
care may an award of maintenance be ordered.
Assuming that an award of maintenance is appropriate under
subsection 308(a), the standards for setting the amount of the
award are set forth in subsection 308(b). Here, as in Section 307,
the court is expressly admonished not to consider the misconduct
of a spouse during the marriage. Instead, the court should consider
the factors relevant to the issue of maintenance, including those
listed in subdivisions 1-6.
35. ABA Family Law Section, Proposed Revised Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act, 7 FAMILY L.Q. 135, 151 (1973); Podell, The Case for Revi-
sion of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 7 FAMILY L.Q. 169, 175
(1973).
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the Republic of South Africa. The Law Reform Commission of
Canada expressed agreement with the scheme of the UMDA
and recommended a new Commonwealth Law of Divorce in which
the provinces will be given the choice between schemes correspond-
ing to the two alternatives of the revised UMDA.
In the discussions between the two organizations, the view of
the Family Law Committee of the ABA prevailed. However, it was
recognized that the new version might not be acceptable to com-
munity property or even other community of acquests jurisdic-
tions. The former version of section 307 was thus added to the
new version as an alternative . 7
36. In WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.080 (1974), the community property
state of Washington has already adopted a system that is closer to alterna-
tive A of the UMDA than to alternative B. The alternatives are set out
in note 37 infra.
37. 1973 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COlMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAws 286, 312 (1973). A slightly amended version of
the UMDA had already been published in 1971 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMAUSSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 236 (1971). Sec-
tion 307 now provides:
Alternative A
[Disposition of Property]
(a) In a proceeding for dissolution of a marriage, legal sep-
aration, or disposition of property following a decree of dissolution
of marriage or legal separation by a court which lacked personal
jurisdiction over the absent spouse or lacked jurisdiction to dispose
of the property, the court, without regard to marital misconduct,
shall, and in a proceeding for legal separation may, finally equi-
tably apportion between the parties the property and assets belong-
ing to either or both however and whenever acquired, and whether
the title thereto is in the name of the husband or wife or both.
In making apportionment the court shall consider the duration of
the marriage, any prior marriage of either party, any antenuptial
agreement of the parties, the age, health, station, occupation,
amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, es-
tate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties, custodial provi-
sions, whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to
maintenance, and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of
capital assets and income. The court shall also consider the contri-
bution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation,
depreciation, or appreciation in value of the respective estates, and
as the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker or to the family
unit.
(b) In the proceeding, the court may protect and promote the
best interests of the children by setting aside a portion of the joint-
ly and separately held estates of the parties in a separate fund
or trust for the support, maintenance, education, and general wel-
fare of any minor, dependent, or incompetent children of the par-
ties.]
Alternative B[Disposition of Property]
In a proceeding for dissolution of the marriage, legal separa-
tion, or disposition of property following a decree of dissolution of
the marriage or legal dissolution by a court which lacked personaljurisdiction over the absent spouse or lacked jurisdiction to dispose
of the property, the court shall assign each spouse's separate prop-
erty to that spouse. It also shall divide community property,
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The new version-alternative A-may we]l reflect the desire
to constitute divorce as a definite termination of the relationship
between the former spouses. Less periodical alimony will be
required if more property of the financially capable spouse is
allotted to the needy spouse. The new version of section 307 may
also appeal to judges and lawyers in the many states where it has
been the practice to reshuffle all the property of divorcing spouses.
For partners who have not kept inventories of what exactly is
owned by him and by her, the presumption that all assets are
acquests or, as previous versions of the UMDA said, marital prop-
erty, can make all property available for redistribution. But does
the scheme correspond to popular expectation? Is marriage truly
seen as a full community of life, of fortune, and of property in
a time in which marriage is no longer seen as an indissoluble
partnership for life? Are we truly far from the stage at which
marriage is widely regarded as a scheme of living and copulating
together until affections erode?
What renders the scheme particularly dangerous is commit-
ting the redistribution of the parties' property to judicial discretion.
It is true that the UMDA seeks to guide this discretion, but it
without regard to marital misconduct, in just proportions after
considering all relevant factors including:
(1) contribution of each spouse to acquisition of the marital
property, including contribution of a spouse as homemaker;
(2) value of the property set apart to each spouse;
(3) duration of the marriage; and
(4) economic circumstances of each spouse when the division
of property is to become effective, including the desirability of
awarding the family home or the right to live therein for a reason-
able period to the spouse having custody of any children.]
COMMENT
Alternative A, which is the alternative recommended generally
for adoption proceeds upon the principle that all the property of
the spouses, however acquired, should be regarded as assets of the
married couple, available for distribution among them, upon con-
sideration of the various factors enumerated in subsection (a). It
will be noted that among these are health, vocational skills and
employability of the respective spouses and these contributions to
the acquisition of the assets, including allowance for the contribu-
tion thereto of the "homemaker's services to the family unit." This
last is a new concept in Anglo-American law.
Subsection (b) affords a way to safeguard the interests of the
children against the possibility of the waste or dissipation of the
assets allotted to a particular parent in consideration of being
awarded the custody or support of a child or children.
Alternative B was included because a number of Commission-
ers from community property states represented that their jurisdic-
tions would not wish to substitute, for their own systems, the great
hotchpot of assets created by Alternative A, preferring to adhere
to the distinction between community property and separate prop-
erty, and providing for the distribution of that property alone, in
accordance with an enumeration of principles, resemblant, so far
as applicable, to those set forth in Alternative A.
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remains discretion that can be exercised over a wide range. It is
unsettled to what extent, if any, the exercise of discretion of trial
judges will be controlled by appellate courts.
Judicial discretion in the distribution of the property of
divorcing spouses may appear to be not only commendable but
indispensable. No hard and fast uniform rule seems able to do jus-
tice to the infinitely varying circumstances of individual cases.
Judicial discretion guided by carefully elaborated statutory direc-
tives may be the only possible way to achieve just results, especially
if the mass to be divided consists of the entire belongings of both
parties.
But, as in all problems of public policy, one has to consider
the price, and the price of individual justice can be high. One can
never entirely foresee how judicial discretion will be exercised, and
foreseeability may be vital to a married person who must decide
whether or not to take the grave step of divorce. A husband wants
to know how much of his property he will have left and to what
extent his future will be burdened with obligations of maintenance
for the ex-wife and support for children who may no longer live
with him. For the wife it may be decisive to know the resources
she can count on for the future. Professor Kahn-Freund has
severely criticized this difficulty of foreseeability as a dangerous
feature of the English system.88
38. Matrimonial Property: Where Do We Go From Here? 11 (Josef
Unger Memorial Lecture, University of Birmingham 1971).
Under the English Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, ch. 18, judicial discre-
tion has been preserved with respect to all "Financial Relief for Parties to
Marriage and Children of Family." Under Section 23(1), the court may
order that either party to the marriage shall make to the other periodical
payments, for such term as may be determined. "Without prejudice to the
generality of the provision," subsection (3) declares that lump sum payment
may be ordered for the purpose of enabling the obligee to meet any liabili-
ties or expenses reasonably incurred by him or her in maintaining himself
or herself or any child of the family before making application for an order
under section 23. For the purpose of "property adjustment" the court may,
under section 24, order "that a party to the marriage shall transfer to the
other party such property as may be so specified, being property to which
the first-mentioned party is entitled, either in possession or reversion." In
section 25 guidance is given to the court for the exercise of the discretion
given to it under sections 23 and 24.
[T]he court . . . [is] to have regard to all the circumstances of
the case including the following matters, that is to say-(a) the income, earning capacity, property and other financial
resources which each of the parties to the marriage has
or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;(b) the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which
each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have
in the foreseeable future;(c) the standard of living enjoyed by the family before the
breakdown of the marriage;
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The unpredictability of the exercise of judicial discretion also
impedes settlement of the property issue by agreement of the par-
ties, who need a firm basis upon which to negotiate. Under the
UMDA, agreement is treated as the most desirable form of settle-
ment, just as it is from the viewpoint of divorcing individuals and
in public opinion. Referral of a vital issue to judicial discretion
can be tantamount to reference to litigation. This means delay,
expense, and often bitterness, even if the venom of mutual accusa-
tions is sought to be excluded by prohibiting consideration of
marital misconduct. An invitation to litigation is undesirable even
where courts are easily accessible, confidence in. judicial wisdom is
high, court calendars are not crowded, procedure is expedient, the
cost is low, and parties may effectively represent themselves with-
out lawyers. These conditions may exist in the Nordic countries,
and perhaps in one or another jurisdiction in the United States.
But can they be assumed to exist everywhere? And where they do
not exist, divorcing parties and their children have to pay a high
price. Of course, the hard and fast establishment of equal distribu-
tion or some other fixed proportion such as the Swiss 2: 1 ratio for
the husband and wife3 9 does not exclude all litigation or dickering.
Title to particular assets, the dates of acquisition, or the particularly
troublesome question of value must all be determined. Still, the
scope of controversy is reduced, a highly unpredictable issue
is eliminated from litigation, and extra-judicial settlement is
facilitated.
In spite of these considerations, some may feel that individual
justice is worth the price. The point is that before we adopt one
or the other legislative solution we must be aware that there is
a price to be paid. We cannot have both individual justice (or more
correctly, the hope of individual justice) and predictable, fast, easy,
and inexpensive disposition of matters of divorce.
(d) the age of each party to the marriage and the duration
of the marriage;(e) any physical or mental disability of either of the parties
to the marriage;(f) the contributions made by each of the parties to the wel-
fare of the family, including any contribution made by
looking after the home or caring for the family;(g) in the case of proceedings for divorce or nullity of mar-
riage, the value to either of the parties to the marriage
of any benefit (for example, a pension) which, by reason
of the dissolution or annulment of the marriage, that party
will lose the chance of acquiring;
and so to exercise those powers as to place the parties, so far as
it is practicable and, having regard to their conduct, just to do so,
in the financial position in which they would have been if the mar-
riage had not broken down and each had properly discharged his
or her financial obligations and responsibilities towards the other.
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, § 25(1).
39. Swiss Civil Code art. 214.
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Of course, in some cases the application of fixed proportion
would lead to results of such shocking inequity that they cannot be
tolerated. Models for the avoidance of insufferable unfairness can
be found in practically all legal systems where equal division is
established as the general rule. Under French law one party may
be ordered to pay the other "damages for the pecuniary or non-
pecuniary harm caused by the dissolution of the marriage. '40 In
extreme cases a claim for damages may also be based upon the
general provision of Civil Code article 1382. 4 1 The original version
of divorce laws in the Nordic countries also provided for an action
for damages to cure inequities of equal distribution. However,
Swedish courts were disinclined to apply this provision because it
compelled them to engage in an investigation of misconduct that
the divorce law has tried to eliminate and that the Swedish courts
felt unable to tackle adequately.42 The original provision of the
Nordic legislation was thus replaced by the new section 11: 122,
which reads as follows:
If in the partition following a divorce [property] division according
to the regular rules is openly unfair in view of the economic cir-
cumstances of the spouses and the duration of the marriage,
division is to be made according to such other principles as appear
appropriate. Neither spouse may, however, receive on the basis of
this provision more than what corresponds to his share of the fund
of the marital goods.
In 1963 the courts of Denmark were given limited discretion to
order unequal division after marriages of short duration and insig-
nificant accumulation of savings from gainful marital activity. 43
Perhaps the most workable solution is that of the West German
Equal Rights Law of 18 June 1957, which established the marital
property system called community of increase. The increases that
have occurred in the estates of each spouse during marriage are
compared with each other. The amount of the smaller increase is
deducted from that of the larger and the difference is divided by
two. The party with the larger increase must then pay the other
exactly one-half of the difference. This general rule can be
changed if it would result in "gross unfairness under the circum-
stances of the case." The law goes on to say that "gross unfairness
40. French Civil Code art. 301, para. 2 as amended by Law of 2 April
1941, validated by Ordinance of 12 April 1945. Since January 1, 1976, the
applicable provision is Civil Code art. 266 in the version of the Divorce Re-
form Law of 11 July 1975.
41. On divorce damages under French law, see Glendon, The French
Divorce Reform Law of 1976, 24 AM. J. COMP. L. 199 (1976).
42. Swedish Marriage Law of 11 June 1920 § 11:24; M. RHEINSTEN,
MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LAW 147 (1972).
43. Denmark, Law of 18 December 1963.
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may exist in particular if the spouse whose property increase has
been the smaller has for an extended period of time been guilty
of failure to satisfy those economic obligations which are implied
in the marital relationship. '44 This approach opens the door to
some exercise of judicial discretion, but it is limited to certain cases
that are not difficult for the parties to predict. In the run-of-the-
mill case the parties will know that the partition will be equal and
that litigation about the proportions would be futile.
V. MARITAL CONTRACT AS A SOLUTION
The most important way to correct a statutorily fixed pro-
portion of distribution may be to allow the parties to provide for
a different disposition in advance of the divorce. In non-Anglo-
American community property jurisdictions, for instance in France
and West Germany, a marital contract may provide that the distri-
bution of the community fund (or, in West Germany, the increase
of the respective estates) shall not be by equal parts. It seems
that in all community property jurisdictions the parties may opt
to exclude community property altogether and to live with their
agreed separation of assets. In such a case, reshuffling of assets on
divorce seems to be excluded altogether. 45
In common law countries, ante-nuptial settlements are less
common, and a contract regarding the financial consequences of a
divorce not immediately pending or even contemplated is generally
regarded as legally invalid. 46 This ancient rule developed when
marriage was still seen as a lifelong union and divorce as a rare
and deplorable social misfortune. Even those to whom divorce still
appears deplorable must see that it is no longer rare and that its
incidence cannot be reduced by legal nonrecognition of contracts
regulating the consequences in advance. The rule of invalidity is
ripe for abandonment. The need for admission of advance contrac-
tual regulation clearly exists in jurisdictions with a fixed propor-
tion of property division. But an equal need for recognition exists
in jurisdictions that leave property distribution to judicial dis-
cretion. Marrying parties of today know that their marriage may
44. German Civil Code § 1381.
45. France, Civil Code art. 1497, no. 5; West Germany, IV STAUDINGER,
KOMMENTAR ZUM BU)RGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH; FAMILIENTECHT § 1408 n.79
(Felgentrdger ed. 1970). For the Netherlands, see D. BRUIJN, HET NEDER-
LANDSE HUWELIJKSVERMOGENSRECHT 375 (2d ed. Soons & Kleijn eds. 1959).
In Sweden, however, while parties may opt for separation of assets, they
may not change the equal division of the community fund if they live under
the legal regime of deferred community property. GB 13:3, 8: 1, para. 2.
46. H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIc RELATIONS § 16.1, at 521 (1968),
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end in divorce, and they must be able to provide for the reduction
of controversy in that eventuality.
It also appears necessary to re-evaluate the hitherto neglected
area of preventing evasion of the property distribution scheme,
whatever it may be, whether it is provided by law or by contractual
agreement. At present the only legal protection available is an
injunction forbidding a party to dispose of all or part of his prop-
erty. Even this remedy is rarely available unless a divorce suit
has been commenced or is impending. There appears to be no
remedy by which a party to a marriage may upon divorce recuper-
ate an asset that was owned by the other and alienated or
encumbered by him. Under the heading of fraud to the widow's
share there has been much discussion about protection in the case
of death.47 While no American state except Louisiana permits the
surviving spouse's indefeasible share in a decedent's estate to be
defeated by testamentary disposition, the protection against defeas-
ance by transaction inter vivos is precarious. A contradiction thus
exists between the extensive protection of the surviving spouse
from disinheritance, and his or her insufficient protection against
defeasance by inter vivos transactions.
Legislatures have not been under much pressure to change this
situation, and courts have been reluctant for two reasons. First,
limitations on a person's freedom to give away or otherwise dispose
of his property may appear to be incompatible with the traditional
view of property as necessarily implying unlimited freedom of use
and disposition. However, in the present age of zoning, eminent
domain, securities regulation, consumer protection, antitrust, envi-
ronment protection, and whatnot, this 19th century ideal no longer
seems to be sacrosanct. The second reason may be the reluctance
to endanger bona fide purchasers more than they already are under
American law. If Mr. A has made a gift of a piece of land,
stock, or a work of art to Donee, Mrs. A might upon Mr. A's death
recover the asset from Mr. B.F.P., to whom Donee has sold it. In
civil law systems a bona fide purchaser is generally protected. Mrs.
A's remedy is against Donee, who may have to pay her the purchase
price he received from Mr. B.F.P. If Donee had no knowledge that
Mrs. A's expectation was impaired by her husband's donation, Do-
nee's duty to pay is limited to the amount he still has. Why should
this approach not also be applicable in common law jurisdictions?
Why should it not apply to both death and divorce? Obviously the
details of the regulation could not be exactly the same in the two
situations.
47. MAcDONALD, FRAUD TO TH WIDoW'S SHARE (1960).
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A clash between seemingly incompatible social theories also
exists in the area of contract regulation of the financial conse-
quences of divorce. A wide measure of freedom to contract appears
to be indispensable for the regulation of property division and the
maintenance of the economically weaker party by the economically
more advantaged. While advance regulation is frowned upon at
present, the law allows or even favors regulation by contract made
in connection with a separation or divorce already pending. In fact,
disposition by party agreement occurs in the overwhelming major-
ity of cases, estimated at some ninety percent or more.48 The prev-
alence of contractual regulation, however, does not dispense with
the necessity for regulation by law. Parties desiring to handle the
matter by their own arrangement want to know what the outcome
would be if the matter were decided by a court. Even where deci-
sion is left to judicial discretion, parties are anxious to know what
practice is generally followed by each of the judges before whom
they may appear, and both parties are likely to engage in maneuvers
tending to get the case before the judge whose practice appears
most favorable.
In the conclusion of contracts-both pre-marital and upon
separation-judicial supervision is appropriate because dominance
by one party over the other can easily occur. In accordance with
prevailing American law, UMDA section 306 provides that in a case
of judicial separation or divorce the agreement must be shown to
the court and the court can declare the agreement invalid if "it
finds after considering the economic circumstances of the parties
and any other relevant evidence produced by the parties, on their
own motion or on request of the court, that the separation agree-
ment is unconscionable." As the Comment to section 306 points
out, the term "unconscionable" is not new. It is found in section
2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code and is being used by courts
in the context of contract cases.
The provision is well meant and probably indispensable, but
the extent to which a separation agreement will actually be scrutin-
ized by the judge of an overcrowded divorce court on his own
motion is dubious. Any unfairness in a pre-marital settlement
designed to regulate a divorce or separation not yet immediately
contemplated is more likely to be brought up by one party only
in a post-divorce proceeding. If attack is made at that stage, the
48. Decrees of divorce are granted without final contest in about 90
percent of all cases in the United States, England, Germany, France, Japan,
and the Nordic countries. See M. RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE,
AND THE LAW 247-60 (1972). In such cases the financial consequences of
the divorce are regulated by agreement of the parties, including open or
tacit agreement not to make any claims.
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exercise of judicial control must be limited to cases of extreme over-
reaching. Parties have a profound interest in clearly understanding
what their financial position will be after the divorce. It must
therefore be possible for them to agree that there will not be judi-
cial modification of the property or maintenance terms of a divorce
decree or of a separation agreement except in extreme circum-
stances of unconscionability at the time of the original deter-
mination. Any limitation of the parties' freedom to provide for
unchangeability must be limited to child support.
VI. THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS
Irrespective of whether the financial consequences of a divorce
are regulated judicially or by agreement of the parties, a thorny
problem is how to deal with future rights of, or expectations to,
pensions, annuities, or other benefits upon retirement or incapacity.
Under schemes such as social security or pensions for employees
of government or private enterprise, an employee's widow is
ordinarily entitled to benefits upon the employee's death. If an
employee is divorced and then dies, his ex-wife is not his widow
and consequently not entitled to widow's benefits. Such claims
seem to belong only to the later wife to whom the employee hap-
pens to be married at the time of his death. The desire to protect
the prior wife from the loss of such benefits is a source of much of
the opposition to no-fault divorce upon unilateral application.49
The problem is becoming more significant as savings increasingly
take the form of pension rights and similar benefits rather than
capital savings.
Where both spouses are actively engaged in gainful pursuits,
and where the wife has her own pension rights, the problem is less
urgent than in cases of old-fashioned housewife marriages or of
modern marriages in which the wife is the breadwinner and the
husband the homemaker. Even so, housewife marriage and female
dependency are still sufficiently common that novel ways of
handling this new form of property in case of divorce are being
sought.
Splitting a governmental pension between the ex-wife of
an employee and his widow has long been the law in Sweden. 50
A penetrating analysis of various possible solutions was undertaken
49. A limited right to object to a unilaterally applied for no-fault di-
vorce is granted, for instance, in the laws of Switzerland, Civil Code art.
142; West Germany, Marriage Law of 21 December 1940 § 48, para. 2; and
England, Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 § 5.
50. M. RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LAW 143
(1972).
[Vol. 12
HeinOnline  -- 12 Willamette L.J. 438 1975-1976
MARITAL PROPERTY DIVISION
by the English Law Commission.51 The West German Law of
197652 contains a detailed attempt to deal legislatively with the
wide variety of possible situations.
Like practically all other problems of property division upon
divorce, the treatment of pension rights and similar benefits is
common to all countries at comparatively equal stages of industrial-
ization. Consideration of foreign attempts at solution is self-
evident for European law makers. American law makers con-
fronted with the problem of how to divide marital property in the
form of retirement benefits might also derive some lessons from
the experiences and errors of their foreign colleagues.
VII. A FINAL OVERVIEW
Consideration of ideas and experiences from abroad could be
as valuable a device in lawmaking and adjudication as the use of
precedent or of learned writing. In most branches of private law
the same problems are encountered in all highly industrialized
countries, and the legal solutions adopted in those countries are
strikingly similar in basic approach, although varying considerably
in detail. In the field of divorce this observation holds true with
particular force.
As discussed earlier in this article, marriage has been under-
going a transformation everywhere in the industrialized world. As
Christianity strengthened its hold over the population of Europe,
marriage was transformed from a private affair between the parties
into an institution strictly regulated by the Church. The existence
of a marriage between the parties became an indispensable condi-
tion for permitting sexual intercourse. All extramarital inter-
course was treated as sinful, and even within marriage intercourse
other than in a normal way apt to produce offspring was considered
sinful. Marriage was to be not only strictly monogamous but
indissoluble. Divorce in the sense of cutting the bond of marriage
and thus enabling a party to remarry or even to have legitimate
intercourse during the lifetime of the other spouse did not exist.
Above all, in the secular sphere, marriage was the one and only
kind of sexual relationship that could produce "legitimate" off-
spring, i.e. offspring capable of succeeding to the status of the
parent and thus to his estate. From the Age of the Reformation
on, control of marriage gradually shifted from the Church to the
state; and in the majority of Protestant countries, divorce became
51. See R.J. LEVY, UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORcE LEGISLATION: A
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 173-84 (1969).
52. Bundesgesetzblatt 1976, 1 1421,
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possible. But even then divorce was conceived of as a faithful
spouse's privilege to repudiate a partner who had been guilty of
serious marital misconduct.
All over the modern world, this traditional conception of
divorce is being abandoned. We are on the way toward the ancient
idea of treating marriage and sex life as private matters. The trend
of not only permitting divorce but transforming it from a punish-
ment for misconduct into an increasingly easy exit from an
unhappy or a merely unsatisfactory situation is proving irresistible.
But the variation from the traditional view of divorce is still
unequal in different jurisdictions. This is true not only among
nations, but also among sister states in America. Also irresistible
has been the changing social and economic role of women. All over
the industrialized world housewife marriage, or marriage for main-
tenance, is giving way to double-earner marriage, but nowhere has
housewife marriage disappeared entirely.
In all jurisdictions the coexistence of the various forms of
marriage has created problems of how to deal with a married
couple's property when the marriage is breaking up. The different
solutions attempted depend to some extent on the imagination and
creativity of individuals in the lawmaking process. But more sig-
nificantly, the solution chosen is a function of the peculiar situation
of each jurisdiction: What type of marriage actually prevails?
What is the politically dominant ideology? Is the body politic
monolithic and thus trying to preserve traditions? Or, at the other
extreme, is it trying to move women en masse from housework to
the labor force? Is the political ideology pluralistically aiming at
accommodating heterogeneous forms of marriage? What degree of
confidence does the population have in its judiciary? To what
extent is the legal profession anxious and able to protect what it
regards as its interests? These and similar questions ought to be
consciously considered wherever and whenever changes in the law
of property division are contemplated. Observation and analysis
of foreign experiences help to raise such contemplations to the level
of purposeful and rational inquiry. It is irrelevant whether the
foreign jurisdiction is within what is called the sphere of the
common law or of the civil law. In the field of divorce this
distinction does not apply.
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